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Introduction 
 
This is truly a working paper, a step along the way in a larger project that is intended to 
culminate in a book on the issue of individual culpability for corporate OHS offences. 
The paper is therefore not a complete account of the issues and is more in the nature of an 
empirical segment of the larger work. The broader context will first be sketched, very 
briefly, to situate the present paper.  
 
Two significant developments are occurring in Australia and overseas in relation to OHS 
offences. The first is the increasing resort to the prosecution of senior company officers, 
as well as the corporate entity, under due diligence provisions of occupational health and 
safety legislation. That is the focus of this paper. The second is the rise of industrial 
manslaughter and workplace fatalities legislation aimed at individual directors or 
managers. This is generally seen as a way of dealing with exceptional cases of “rogue” 
employers who are reckless with respect to the welfare of their employees, people whose 
culpability is hardly in doubt. That is not the subject of this paper, although it will be 
dealt with in the final work.  
 
In much Australian OHS law now, where a company is proved to have committed an 
offence, its senior officers are deemed to have committed the same offence, subject to 
various qualifications1. The purpose of punishment in these circumstances is unclear. On 
one view the purpose is to provide an incentive for senior officers to attend more 
diligently to their OHS responsibilities. This is a version of the deterrence justification – 
what is being deterred is insufficient attention to OHS. Another justification is that these 
individuals are personally culpable and that they deserve to be punished. These two 
justifications are very different in nature. Deterrence is a consequentialist justification; 
and immediately gives rise to an empirical question – does punishment have the intended 
effect? Desert is a moral idea, more a matter for debate and discussion than empirical 
evaluation. 
 
This paper is concerned with the prosecutions arising out the Gretley mine disaster in 
1996. It examines the findings about the culpability of the individuals and corporations 
prosecuted. The paper contains two draft chapters from the proposed book. Comments 
and corrections are invited.  
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CHAPTER A 
 
GRETLEY - RELIANCE ON FAULTY PLANS 
 
Disaster struck the Gretley Colliery near Newcastle (NSW) on 14 November 1996. 
Miners inadvertently broke through into the flooded workings of an old abandoned mine, 
and four miners died in the inrush of water. Inrush from old workings is a well known 
mining hazard2. How could this possibly have occurred?  
 
Several years  earlier3 Gretley management had obtained from the Department of Mineral 
Resources some old plans that purported to indicate the location of the earlier workings. 
Unfortunately the plans were wrong, indicating that the old workings were 100 metres 
further away than they actually were. Initially, mining was remote from the old workings. 
However, in 1994 Gretley management began planning a new section of the mine that 
would take them close to the old workings4. Using the department’s plans,  they drew up 
their own  plan showing where they believed the old workings to be  and where they 
proposed to mine.    The mine surveyor at the time assumed that the plans provided by 
the department were accurate and the manager, relying on his surveyor, made the same 
assumption. At the time of the tragedy two years later the mine had a new surveyor and a 
new manager, and both men assumed that the maps were accurate, relying on the 
judgments of their predecessors. Indeed the new surveyor certified the accuracy of the 
plans in writing, based simply on the fact that they had been so certified by the previous 
surveyor.5 Both managers had also implicitly certified the accuracy of the plans in 
writing.6  
 
The faulty maps were produced by a departmental draftsman for another purpose in 
19807. So it was that a drafting error, made long before the Gretley mine began 
operations, culminated sixteen years later in disaster. This is a classic example of what 
Reason has called a latent error8, an error that lies dormant for many years before, in 
conjunction with new circumstances, its catastrophic potential is realized. As the judge in 
an earlier inquiry noted, the plans “sat like a loaded gun in the archives”9, waiting to be 
fired. 
 
The operating company and its owning company10 were charged and found guilty under 
the NSW OHS Act for failing to ensure the safety of employees, so far as reasonably 
practicable11. The companies were aghast that they should be blamed in this way. They 
argued vigorously that they had been entitled to rely on the accuracy of the plans and that 
they were therefore not responsible for the tragedy. The prosecution alleged, however, 
and the judge agreed, that management should not have relied on the plans provided and 
should have sought to verify their accuracy independently. The judge’s thinking on this 
point is worth quoting. 
 
“The defendants submit that the cause of the inrush was (the department’s drafting 
error)…I fundamentally disagree. The cause of the inrush, in my view, was the 
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failure by the defendants to properly research the location and the extent of … the 
old workings”.12
 
This is a puzzling statement. Had the department not made the error it did, the accident 
would not have happened. Had the defendants researched the location of the old workings 
more carefully, the accident would not have happened. From this point of view, if one is 
a cause, so is the other. Clearly, therefore, the judge’s statement is not to be understood in 
this way. Instead, in placing the causal emphasis where he did, he was making a 
statement about the relative culpability of the parties13. His thinking was as follows:  
 
“There is no doctrine of implied infallibility to be applied to the information, 
documentary or otherwise, given out by any government department. While it is 
reasonable to presume that such information would generally be correct, that in no 
way removes the defendant’s independent obligation to ensure the accuracy of the 
information”14
 
However, he did qualify this position when it came to sentencing the defendants. 
 
“It is clear that the role of the Department… in providing the incorrect Record 
Tracings to the defendants and that the Department has not been prosecuted has 
caused the defendants to feel ‘a justifiable sense of injustice’… Those feelings are 
understandable”15
 
He therefore accepted that the Department’s error was a mitigating factor in relation to 
the culpability of the defendants16, but he insisted that the companies were independently 
culpable for failing to verify the plans. 
 
That failure was essentially a failure to carry out an adequate risk assessment17. Inrush 
from old workings was a well known hazard with the potential to cause multiple 
fatalities, and there were several recorded cases overseas of multiple deaths occurring in 
this way. Had this risk been adequately assessed the need for more effective risk control 
measures would have been obvious. The critical nature of the plans and the need to be 
certain of their accuracy would have been highlighted18, as would the need to respond 
effectively to some of the indicators the plans might be in error which began to appear in 
the days before the inrush. The failure to respond to these indicators will be discussed 
later. 
 
In order to be clear about just what was alleged against the companies, the prosecution 
charged them with a series of offences, but these were for the most part consequential on 
the initial failure to check the accuracy of the plans19. As the judge said: 
 
“The genesis of many of the defendant’s failures derives from what I characterize as 
its primary failure to properly research the location and extent of the... old 
workings. To a large extent… the particularized failures... arise derivatively from 
the primary failure”20.  
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The derivative nature of many of the charges was taken into account at the time of 
sentencing, and for present purposes it is convenient to speak of a single offence .  
 
The NSW Act also states that, where a corporation commits an offence, all those 
concerned in the management of the corporation are guilty of the same offence, unless 
they show that they were not in a position to influence the conduct of the corporation or, 
if they were, they used “all due diligence” to prevent the contravention. The court 
convicted both managers under this provision, as well as the second surveyor, the first 
surveyor having died of cancer a month prior to the accident21. Conviction meant that 
these three individuals were found  
• to be concerned in the management of the corporation,  
• to have been in a position to influence the conduct of the corporation in relevant 
respects, and  
• to have failed to exercise due diligence to prevent the contravention 
 
The first two of these points are not at issue here; what is of particular interest is the 
finding that the managers and surveyor had failed to exercise due diligence.  
 
What was it the judge expected them to have done? To answer this question we need to 
understand more about the nature of the error in the plans which had been given to mine 
management. 
 
The nature of the mistake 
 
The old mine, worked until 191222, was known as the Young Wallsend Colliery. Mining 
had taken place in two parallel coal seams, a top seam and a bottom seam, separated by 
18 metres of other material.23
 
In 1993 the Department provided Gretley management with two plans, one headed 
Young Wallsend Coal Workings Bottom Seam, and the other headed Young Wallsend 
Coal Workings Top Seam24. The two plans were , identified as RT (Record Tracing) 523, 
sheets 2 and 3, respectively. Gretley intended to mine the top seam. Sheet 3, therefore, 
was the one on which it relied. Both sheets carried notations indicating that they had been 
traced from a single earlier tracing. This earlier tracing, known as sheet 1 was not 
provided to Gretley management and never requested by mine management, although it 
was available in the department25. 
 
Sheet 1, the earlier tracing, was the key to what went wrong. It had been drawn up 
initially in 1892 and contained various amendments to incorporate additional work 
carried out prior to cessation of mining in 191226. But there was one very peculiar feature 
of this plan: it indicated two sets of workings or tunnels, one in red and one in black. 
Moreover these two sets overlapped each other. Crucially, there was no indication on the 
plan as to what distinguished the red from the black. As the judge said, 
 
“Any person looking at RT523 sheet 1 could not help but wonder as to the precise 
import of the red and black workings and their relationship to each other” 27  
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In 1980, another mining company, BHP, asked the Department for separate plans of the 
old workings in the top and bottom seams. It was in response to this request that the 
sheets 2 and 3 were produced.28 The unknown person who drew up sheets two and three 
resolved the uncertainty about the meaning of the black and the red by assuming that one 
colour referred to the top seam and one to the bottom seam and that these two sets of 
workings at different levels had been superimposed on a single sheet at the time sheet 1 
was originally created. They could therefore be separated into two sheets. In separating 
them out, the person concerned made the further assumption that the red workings 
referred to the bottom seam and the black to the top. To repeat, there were no annotations 
or other indications on Sheet 1 that justified these decisions and, as the judge noted, “on 
any view, that was a big call to make”29. It needs to be emphasized, here, just how 
extraordinary these decisions were. As far as can be ascertained they were no more than 
guesses. As it turned out, the guesses were wrong. Both red and black workings were in 
the same seam, the top seam, the seam that Gretley was later to mine30. So it was that the 
plan relied on by Gretley management failed to show a significant section of the 
workings that had occurred in the seam. The disaster occurred when Gretley miners broke 
through into these unmarked workings.  
 
How should the surveyors have behaved? 
 
Against this background we can now be more explicit about how, in the judge’s view, 
mine officials ought to have behaved. His view was based in part on expert evidence 
about what could be expected of a competent surveyor. The essence of that expert 
evidence was as follows31. 
 
The two plans handed over to Gretley contained various puzzles. For instance, the 
purported workings in the bottom seam would have been almost impossible to ventilate. 
Moreover, every surveyor knows that transcription is liable to create errors. These plans 
had not been certified by the Department and the possibility of error was correspondingly 
greater. A competent surveyor would, therefore, have asked the Department for sheet 1, 
on which sheets two and three were based. An examination of sheet 1 would have raised 
doubts about whether it was intended to represent two sets of workings in different seams 
superimposed on each other. For a start, there were no notations on the sheet to indicate 
that this was the case. Furthermore, looking at sheet 1 more closely revealed that, where 
the red and black workings overlapped they did so exactly. If they had really been in 
different seams there is no way they could have aligned so exactly, and in any case there 
was no particular reason to expect top and bottom tunnels to align at all. These and other 
anomalies raised serious doubts about the decision to separate the two sets of workings as 
the Department had done. It was very evident from an examination of sheet 1 that sheets 
2 and 3 could not be relied on and that other methods would need to be used to determine 
the exact location of the old workings32. In the judge’s words: 
 
“the defendant and those acting on its behalf failed to recognize the glaring 
inconsistencies that sheets 2 and 3 presented…They were not such inconsistencies 
that a competent surveyor should have failed to recognize them. The evidence… is 
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compelling as to the extent of the basic surveying principles ignored by those 
charged with the responsibility to check such matters and who seemingly embraced 
sheets 2 and 3 without questions”33
 
He added, 
 
“Any competent mine surveyor would not only ask to look at and obtain a copy of 
sheet 1, but having done so, would immediately be alerted to the anomalies and 
irregularities in sheet 1 and question the basis of the decision made within the 
Department to separate and depict the red and black workings in the way that was 
done” 34
 
The surveyor’s failure to take any additional steps to verify the plans was, according to 
the judge “the essence of (his) culpability”.35  
 
How should the managers have behaved? 
 
The managers had relied on their surveyors and the judge recognized that this was to 
some degree inevitable. The expert witness had said: 
 
“The mine manager has the ultimate responsibility but would rely on the expertise 
of the other professionals available to him. He is in effect the captain of the team 
and he should not be expected to be a surveyor, a mechanical engineer and an 
electrical engineer and so on.”36  
 
The judge acknowledged this, but he went on: 
 
“Where Mr P failed, in my view, is that in taking steps to satisfy himself as to the 
accuracy of sheets 2 and 3 in properly identifying the location and extent of the old 
colliery, he too easily accepted the assurances he was given by the respective mine 
surveyors. He took no independent steps beyond that assurance. It was, I believe, a 
one-off but serious error of judgment. In that respect he failed to take the essential 
but fundamental step required of him in accord with the provisions of the s 37(2)(h) 
of the CMRA that as mine manager he: 
 
“take such steps as may be necessary to ensure that at all times the manager is in 
possession of …all available information regarding disused excavations or 
workings in the vicinity of the mine” 
 
That responsibility was his and his alone. At the very least he owed it to himself to 
direct his Mine Surveyors and any other relevant staff to proactively research every 
available source for all information regarding the old workings. The implications if 
sheets 2 and 3 were wrong demanded that. That is not something Mr P could 
delegate. Nor is it something that required additional skills and knowledge…That to 
me is the essence of Mr P’s culpability”37.  
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In relation to the other manager there was evidence that he had actively questioned one of 
the mine surveyors about the accuracy of the plans38 but, as the judge noted,  
he did not look at the plans himself to “ascertain whether in his view they were reliable. 
In this respect he relied entirely on (the surveyor)”39. His culpability was essentially the 
same as Mr P’s.40
 
The penalties 
 
The penalties imposed on the various defendants were as follows  
 
Operating company   $730,000 
Owning company  $730,000 
First mine manager    $30,000 
Second mine manager    $42,000 
Mine surveyor     $30,000 
 
In order to understand the significance of these penalties, they need to be seen in relation 
to the maximum penalties available under the legislation at the time of the offence. The 
defendants were each convicted of several offences41 and the judge imposed sentences for 
each offence. But since, as explained earlier, most offences were consequential on a 
single initial failure, he then discounted the penalties in various ways.  
 
In the case of the corporations, the maximum penalty per offence was $500,000 and the 
notional penalty assessed for several of these offences was $300,000 per offence, in each 
case more than half the maximum possible. After discounting, and splitting the fine 
equally between the two corporations, the fine for each corporation came to $730,000. In 
this way the total fine per corporation came to more than the maximum possible per 
offence. 
 
For the individual defendants, the judge proceeded a little differently. The maximum for 
an offence was $50,00042. He determined a notional fine for each offence. But instead of 
discounting, and then adding the discounted fines to determine a final figure, he reversed 
the process. He selected a total which he intended to impose on each individual and then 
apportioned this penalty between the various offences in such a way that they added to 
the pre-determined total. This procedure suggests that the judge was treating the $50,000 
maximum not just as the maximum fine per offence, but also as the maximum fine per 
offender. As a result, the total fine imposed on each individual did not exceed the 
maximum fine per offence, as it did in the case of the corporations. It is noteworthy, 
however, that the total fine for each individual was in the upper half of the $50,000 
penalty range. 
 
The sentencing rationale - culpability 
 
I turn now to the sentencing rational articulated by the judge in imposing these fines. His 
starting point was the “objective seriousness of offence”43. At law “seriousness of 
offence” is an alternative way of talking about the culpability of the defendant, and it  is 
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clear from the context that this was the judge’s understanding. Any inquiry into the 
meaning or “objective seriousness” is therefore also  an inquiry into the meaning of 
culpability.  
 
Culpability is a very basic idea, not in any way limited to legal contexts; it means quite 
simply, blameworthiness or fault. The question of interest is how we decide whether 
someone is blameworthy or at fault. More specifically, here, we are interested in how the 
law made judgments about culpability in the Gretley case. Precisely because culpability 
is an idea that is broader than the law, we are entitled to appeal to these broader, if 
intuitive, understandings in evaluating the legal criteria. I shall want to do that at some 
points. 
 
OHS legislation does not prohibit death and injury; it imposes a duty on employers 
(among others) to maintain a safe workplace as far as reasonably practicable. The point is 
that a workplace may be patently unsafe and an employer therefore liable to prosecution, 
even though no death or injury has occurred. The fact of death or injury is not strictly 
relevant. As legal authorities have said, “the gravity of the consequences of an accident, 
such as damage or injury, does not, in itself, dictate the seriousness of the offence or the 
amount of penalty”44  
 
It has to be said that this legal principle does not seem to operate in practice with 
anything like this clarity. Many regulatory agencies state that their policy is to prosecute 
when it is in the “public interest” and that the occurrence of death or serious injury is one 
of the factors taken in to account in determining the public interest. Thus, for instance, 
the major OHS regulator in NSW, WorkCover, states in its guidelines that “WorkCover 
tends to prosecute when a death has occurred, when there has been a serious injury, or 
when there has been a risk of fatal or serious injury.”45 The policy of the NSW mining 
industry inspectorate is that , “generally speaking the more serious an offence and the 
more serious its actual or potential consequences, the more likely it will be that the public 
interest will lead to prosecution”46. It is clear from these statements that the actual 
occurrence of death or injury is indeed relevant to the decision to prosecute. In practice it 
is rare for prosecutions to occur in the absence of such harm. Imagine for a moment that 
the Gretley management had discovered its mistake at the last moment and stopped 
mining just in time to avoid the disaster, and assume the inspectorate was aware of what 
had happened. It is inconceivable in these circumstances that the earlier failure to check 
the accuracy of the plans or to carry out an adequate risk assessment in relation to the 
danger from old workings would have resulted in prosecution.  
 
This last conclusion is supported by a statement made by the NSW Chief Inspector of 
mines at the initial inquiry into the Gretley disaster. The Department’s de facto policy, he 
said, was to consider prosecution only when there had been a death or serious injury 
stemming from the violation, or when companies were failing to comply despite repeated 
warnings47. This is a far cry from the legislative intent. 
 
But to return to the judge’s reasoning, regardless of whether anyone was actually killed, 
the potential consequences of the failure to check the accuracy of the plans were 
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extremely serious. This increased the seriousness of the offence itself, that is, the level of 
culpability. 
 
Forseeability is a second factor taken into account by the judge in determining 
seriousness of offence. He quoted approvingly from another judgment, as follows: 
 
“The degree of foreseeability is a significant fact to be taken in to account when 
assessing the level of culpability of the defendant. The existence of a reasonably 
foreseeable risk to safety which is likely to result in serious injury or death is a 
factor which will be relevant to the assessment of the gravity of the offence.”48  
 
The defence argued that the judge needed to make a distinction between the 
foreseeability of inrush in the vicinity of old workings and the foreseeability that the 
plans were incorrect, and that it was the forseeability that the plans were incorrect which 
needed to be considered in determining culpability. Inrush was a risk that was foreseeable 
and indeed foreseen. What was not foreseen was an error in the plans. This was rather 
less foreseeable than the risk of inrush itself49. The culpability was correspondingly less.  
 
The judge rejected this reasoning. The question was “whether there was an obvious or 
foreseeable risk to safety against which appropriate measures were not taken”50. The 
answer was, yes, inrush was an obvious risk, yet the measures taken were far from 
adequate. In the circumstances of such an obvious risk, the mine should not have been 
relying unquestioningly on the plans provided.  
 
It has to be said that this is a curious piece of reasoning. The judge had determined that 
the culpability of the surveyor lay in his not being alert of the possibility that the plans 
might be in error. A competent surveyor would have foreseen that possibility and taken 
steps to verify the accuracy of the plans, he said. The surveyor’s culpability lay in his 
failure to foresee what was reasonably foreseeable. Similarly, according to the judge, the 
culpability of the managers lay in failing to seek independent verification of the accuracy 
of the plans. The desirability of seeking independent verification logically entails 
foresight of the possibility that the plans might be in error. If error in the plans is not a 
foreseeable possibility, why bother to verify them? I shall assume in what follows that the 
relevant failure of foresight was the failure to foresee that the plans might be in error.  
 
A further factor relevant to culpability is whether or not the offence is part of a general 
pattern of failure to attend to risk or, on the contrary, an isolated aberration51. The judge 
found that  
• the defendants, both corporate and personal, were generally safety conscious;  
• the company had a effective safety management system;  
• there was “an active workplace safety culture among employees and corporate 
defendants”; and  
• workers were encouraged to cease work when they encountered a hazard;52 
• there was a “genuine commitment to workplace safety” on the part of all 
defendants. 
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Conversely, “there is no evidence that suggests the defendants had overall demonstrably 
unsafe systems of work or were indifferent as to their workplace responsibilities in 
relation to safety”53. This led the judge to conclude that the failure to properly research 
the location of the old workings was “a most significant and serious lapse in an otherwise 
demonstrable commitment to providing a safe workplace”54   
 
This last conclusion is clearly overstated. A good safety management system is no 
guarantee against lapses and errors of various sorts. Every credible safety system audit 
finds problems; an audit which doesn’t is hardly credible55. It is doubtful that the lapse 
identified in this case was unique and no sensible manager would ever make such a 
claim. The comment must be seen as the judge’s way of giving credit where credit was 
due and treating the company’s generally laudable approach to safety as a mitigating 
factor, reducing the level of culpability. 
 
The other mitigating factor, already mentioned, was role of the Department in providing 
incorrect information. In a sense the judge had found that the Department should share 
some of the blame for what had happened. But despite these mitigating factors, he still 
assessed the culpability of all the defendants as being, as he said, “towards the high end 
of the range of penalty available”.56  
 
The sentencing rationale – retribution 
 
The concept of retribution was discussed in an earlier chapter (not in this paper) and was 
equated with the idea that punishment is required so that offenders receive their just deserts.  
Furthermore, the need for retribution was seen to be directly proportional to degree of 
culpability. 
 
However, at one point in his sentence the judge in the Gretley case made a distinction 
between culpability and retribution. He stated that the penalty must properly reflect the 
defendant’s “culpability and society’s retribution”57 In so saying he appeared to be 
suggesting that penalty would be determined not only by the level ofculpability, but also 
society’s need for retribution. He did not expand in this second purpose, but it invites 
consideration. 
 
The NSW Crimes (Sentencing Procedure) Act 1999 which guided the judge in the 
sentencing process58 contains a statement of the purposes of sentencing59. Retribution is not 
explicitly included among these purposes. The statement does, however, include the 
following two purposes:  
(a) to ensure that the offender is adequately punished for the offence; 
(g) to recognize the harm done to the victim of the crime and the community.  
 
Arguably the first of these refers to the defendant’s culpability and the second to society’s 
need to see the offender punished. If so, they provide a basis for the judge’s distinction. 
 
There is of course a problem with this distinction. It suggests that society’s need to see 
offenders punished is to be given weight independently of the question of culpability, or 
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at least over and above the question of culpability. This is hardly tenable. No court could 
responsibly impose a penalty higher than was warranted by the degree of culpability 
simply because of societal demand. Nevertheless, in the Gretley case there was public 
pressure to see significant punishments imposed60. Realistically there was only one way 
the court could impose substantial punishments, and that was if the defendants were 
found to be highly culpable. There is no way of knowing whether the need to satisfy 
public opinion influenced the judgments about culpability in this way. All that we can say 
is that the fact that the defendants were in fact found to be highly culpable meant that 
society’s need for retribution could be satisfied. 
 
The sentencing rationale - remorse 
 
Earlier discussion referred to the objective seriousness of the offence as the basis of 
judgments about culpability. The judge noted that there were additional subjective 
features which impacted on culpability. Remorse and contrition were singled out for 
particular consideration. These two ideas are very similar; arguably they are 
indistinguishable. The judge did not distinguish between the two and I shall not do so 
here.  
 
In principle remorse can affect a sentencing decision in two ways61. First, it may reduce the 
gravity of the offence in the eyes of a judge, so that purposes of retribution may be served by 
a lesser sentence. Second, if the offender is truly remorseful it means that some measure of 
rehabilitation has occurred, that further offences are less likely, and that the need for specific 
deterrence is therefore lessened.  
 
Human beings are capable of remorse, but it is hard to conceive of a remorseful corporation. 
Nevertheless, corporations were in the dock in the Gretley case and the judge was obliged to 
give some attention to the concept of corporate remorse.  
 
When Esso was prosecuted in 2001, following the gas plant explosion at Longford in 1998, 
the judge found that Esso had failed to exhibit any remorse62. He took this view on three 
grounds. First, the company had engaged in litigious treatment of its employees, blaming 
them for the explosion. Second, the legal defence it had advanced was one of obfuscation, 
designed not to clarify but to obscure. Third, the company had failed to accept responsibility 
for the explosion.  
 
These conclusions were put to the judge as relevant in the Gretley case63. He found, 
however, that the Gretley companies had not engaged in litigious treatment of their 
employees and that their defence, while vigorous, was not designed to obscure. On the 
question of whether the companies accepted responsibility, the evidence was not as stark as 
it had been in the Esso case64. Nevertheless, the defendants in the Gretley case clearly felt 
that the department was to blame. “In that sense the defendants, both corporate and personal 
(with the exception of Mr P – of which more below) have demonstrated a reluctance to 
accept full and practical responsibility”65. Of course they deeply regretted what had 
happened but in the absence of any acceptance of responsibility, this did not amount to 
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remorse. 66 Accordingly, (apart from Mr P), there were no grounds here for mitigating the 
penalties. 
 
As for Mr P, the manager at the time of the accident, under questioning, he explicitly 
accepted responsibility and expressed remorse. He spoke about the searing impact which the 
accident had and continued to have on his life. The judge stated that this was “the fullest 
expression of remorse and contrition he had ever encountered in circumstances of a 
workplace accident”67.  
 
It is difficult to gauge the impact of the remorse factor on penalties. The judge was at 
pains to stress that the absence of remorse did not increase the penalties68 . But to what 
extent did Mr P’s expression of remorse reduce the penalty imposed on him? In fact he 
was fined $42,000, while the other manager and the surveyor were fined $30,000 each. 
The differing fines reflect the differing circumstances in which these individuals found 
themselves; Mr P was manager at the time of the accident. But one thing is clear: Mr P’s 
expression of remorse did not save him from the judge’s conclusion that he was the most 
culpable of the three. 
 
The sentencing rationale – deterrence 
 
Although the primary factor determining the penalty was the seriousness of the offence, it 
was not the only factor to be taken into account. Punishment was also expected to have a 
deterrent effect, both on the offenders concerned (specific deterrence) and on potential 
offenders (general deterrence)69. The need for such deterrent effects influences the 
penalty: where the need for deterrence is considerable, the penalty can be increased; 
where it is minimal, the penalty can be reduced. We consider here how the issue of 
deterrence affected sentencing for corporate and personal defendants, in turn70. 
 
In relation to the companies, the judge accepted that industry as a whole had learnt the 
lessons concerning the need to be particularly vigilant about the risk of inrush, and that 
companies now approached old mining plans with the utmost caution. From this point of 
view the general deterrent effect which punishment might be expected to have on the 
industry as a whole had already been achieved. However, in the judge’s view, this did not 
eliminate totally the need for general deterrence. He quoted approvingly the following 
words from another judgment: 
 
“The fundamental duty of the court in this important area of public concern [is] to 
ensure a level of penalty for a breach as will compel attention to occupational health 
and safety issues so that persons are not exposed to risks to their health and safety 
in the workplace”71. 
 
The reasoning here seems almost contradictory: if the general deterrent effect has already 
been achieved, how can it still be necessary for the sentence to have a general deterrent 
effect? However, if the aim is to make companies more careful about hazards in general, 
not just the hazard of inrush, then the court’s reasoning remains coherent. 
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As for specific deterrence, some time after the accident the defendant companies were 
acquired by the mining multinational, Xstrata. Although this company had nothing to do 
with the accident, the judge took the view that specific deterrence was relevant to Xstrata. 
 
“The evidence… as to Xstrata’s comprehensive system of workplace safety standards, 
while commendable, highlights factors that, in my view, reinforce the need for specific 
deterrence to be taken into account in the current sentencing process... The defendants are 
part of a large corporate enterprise that must maintain constant vigilance and take all 
practicable precautions to ensure safety in the workplace… While steps taken by the 
defendants to date post the inrush are to be commended, the scope of the defendant’s 
ongoing obligations requires the need to encourage a sufficient level of diligence by the 
defendants in the future”72.  
 
Since Xstrata was in no way responsible for the accident, these comments about specific 
deterrence are a little perplexing. It is arguable that Xstrata occupies the same position as 
any other mining company in this matter and that, in so far as the penalty can be expected 
to have any deterrent effect on Xstrata, it is better viewed as a general rather than a 
specific deterrent effect.  
 
The conceptual difficulties highlighted in the previous discussion would be of concern if 
it was clear that considerations of deterrence were significant in the final decision on 
penalties. There is no evidence however that they were. As noted earlier, in the judge’s 
view the offence in and of itself merited a penalty towards the top end of the range and 
that is what it received. 
 
The situation in relation to the individual defendants was a little different. Overall, the 
judge accepted that none of them was as culpable as the corporate defendants since each 
had played only a part in determining the outcome. 
 
As for deterrence, his view was that in all cases, “general deterrence has some, albeit 
limited, application”.73 Presumably what he meant was that the sentence was intended to 
send a signal to other mining officials of the need to be diligent with respect to safety. 
The judge was clear, however, that there was no need for the sentence to have any 
specific deterrent effect on the individuals concerned. All three had clearly learnt the 
lesson and needed no further incentive. All had suffered greatly. Moreover, all had 
undergone various “rehabilitative measures”. The two mine managers had completed risk 
management courses and the surveyor had attended various lectures and retraining 
seminars for surveyors74. Despite this, the individual defendants received fines in the 
upper half of the penalty range. It would seem, then, that the issue of deterrence played a 
relatively small part when it came to the determination of sentence.   
 
Culpability reconsidered 
 
Having described the considerations which went to the sentencing of the corporate and 
individual defendants, let us return to the question of culpability and consider in a little more 
detail what it meant in the Gretley case.  
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Judgments about culpability are judgments about moral rectitude, about the degree of 
wickedness, if you like. These are fundamentally human characteristics. It is very difficult to 
talk meaningfully about the moral rectitude or wickedness of a corporation75. There is a 
famous saying that a corporation “has no body to be kicked or soul to be damned”. We can 
talk about whether a corporation is law abiding, whether it is deterrable, whether, from a 
policy point of view, it is useful to hold corporations liable and to punish them76. But, it 
makes little sense to talk about whether a corporation, as such,  is blameworthy77.  There are 
various solutions to this problem. The law recognizes that “a corporate employer can only 
conduct its activities through human agents, such as its managers, supervisors, employees 
and contractors”78  Thus, to say that a corporation failed to foresee what was reasonably 
foreseeable is to say that relevant managers failed to foresee what was reasonably 
foreseeable79. 
 
Transferring the culpability of individuals to corporations in this way seems artificial, indeed 
counter-intuitive. But the criminal law generally requires a finding of culpability before 
heavy punishment can be imposed, and transferring individual culpability to the corporation 
is one way this can be achieved. In this sense, corporate culpability is simply a derivative of 
individual culpability `  
 . 
What, then, can we say about individual culpability in the Gretley case? Note, first, that 
judgments about culpability are not factual judgments. They cannot be made by reference to 
evidence alone. A judgment about culpability is a value judgment, about what people ought 
or ought not to have done. Implicit in such judgments is a comparison with how some other, 
reference individual would have behaved. To blame someone is to say that their behaviour 
in some way falls short of the behaviour of the reference individual. 
 
Let us explore in a little more detail the characteristics of this implied reference individual. 
Recall that the judge talked about a competent surveyor and concluded that the surveyors at 
Gretley had not behaved as a competent surveyor would have. The inference is that they 
were incompetent. But incompetence is hardly a moral evaluation. If they were indeed 
incompetent, they can hardly be blamed for this. The fault lies with the education system 
which had certified them competent, or with management which had not verified their 
competence for the job at hand. The fact that the behaviour of the surveyors fell short of how 
a competent surveyor would have behaved hardly makes them culpable. In short, the 
competent surveyor is not the reference individual we are looking for. 
 
In finding the individual defendants culpable, the judge was explicitly finding that they had 
failed to exercise “all due diligence”. How would a person who was exercising all due 
diligence be behaving? According to Johnstone,  
 
“due diligence is generally accepted as the converse of negligence and requires 
reasonable care in all the circumstances… What is due diligence will depend on all the 
circumstances of the case, and contemplates a mind concentrated on the facts. It is to 
be decided objectively according to the standard of the reasonable person in the 
circumstances”80.  
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Here, then, is our reference individual – the reasonable person in the circumstances, the 
reasonable surveyor or the reasonable manager.  
 
What can we say about these reference individuals contemplated by the court - the 
reasonable surveyor and the reasonable manager? Are they, for instance, the ordinary or 
average81 surveyor and manager? What we know is that neither of the two managers and 
neither of the two surveyors behaved in the way the judge believed the reasonable person in 
the circumstances would have behaved. All four accepted the accuracy of the plans 
provided. Were all four unreasonable men?  
 
The Gretley defendants accepted that old  plans might have small errors in them,  which  
could arise in the following way. Mines which are being actively worked  must update their 
mine plans every three months82. If mining at an old colliery was terminated between 
updates, some workings would remained unrecorded. Errors of up to 26 metres had been 
known to occur in this way83. To allow for this, Gretley mine management intended to leave 
a barrier of 50 metres between itself and where the old workings were thought to be. Apart 
from errors of this nature,  the assumption was that the plans provided by the department 
were accurate and could be relied upon. 
 
The evidence suggests that other mine managers and surveyors made similar assumptions. 
The Gretley mine manager who immediately preceded the two  who were charged said that 
he had accepted the accuracy of the plans provided by the department. “That was always our 
position and I believe the view of the mining industry, up until the inrush itself”.84  An  
earlier surveyor at Gretley had accepted the accuracy of the plans and had certified them as 
accurate85. The chief company surveyor also assumed that the plans were accurate.86  
 
Two  mines adjacent to Gretley had made the same assumptions87. They had  been provided 
with the same departmental plans which their surveyors had duly certified. This was known 
to Gretley managers,  which reinforced their  assumption that that the plans were accurate.  
 
The chief inspector of coal mines also assumed the accuracy of the plans. “Up until this 
accident (he said) I regarded record tracings supplied by the department as accurate 
representations of old workings. I had never previously seen a record tracing that I knew to 
be inaccurate”88. Finally, a senior inspector gave evidence that he assumed that the plans 
provided by the department were accurate89 and he noted that this assumption was “well 
entrenched and accepted – both at Gretley and adjacent mines”.90   
 
The initial inquiry conceded all this. It accepted “that a sizeable number of individuals 
within the mining industry assumed before the inrush that 50 metres… offered adequate 
protection against inadequate plans”.91
 
It is clear then that many, perhaps most   surveyors and managers would have behaved as the 
defendants did. If that is so, the ordinary mine surveyor and manager does not qualify as 
reasonable in the judge’s view; the reasonable officials he had in mind are probably few and 
far between.  
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This is a significant departure from community perceptions of reasonableness92. The 
reasonable person was once famously defined as the man on Clapham omnibus, and more 
recently, as the traveller on the London underground93. Such descriptions are intended to 
convey that the reasonable person is an ordinary person, not an unusually diligent or careful 
person. Yet this is precisely what the judge was requiring of the individuals before him, that 
they be unusually diligent and careful, indeed that they behave as the ideal surveyor or 
manager would behave94. If the reference individuals in the judge’s mind were the ideal 
surveyor and the ideal manager, it is to be expected that real live surveyors and managers 
will fall short of these ideals. To conclude on this basis that real live individuals have 
behaved unreasonably and therefore culpably seems unfair. 
 
Jim Reason has developed this line of thinking into a test for whether or not it is appropriate 
to blame an employee who violates rules. He terms it the substitution test. Mentally 
substitute the individual concerned with someone else who has the same training and 
experience and ask: “In the light of how events unfolded and were perceived by those 
involved… is it likely that this new individual would have behaved any differently?”95 If the 
answer is no, there are clearly systemic factors generating the behaviour concerned and it is 
better to seek to change those factors than to blame the individual rule violator. This 
principle applies to managers as much as it does to front line workers and it provides a 
rationale for rejecting the culpability of the individual Gretley defendants for relying on 
faulty plans.  
 
For all these reasons, it is hard to agree with the judge that the culpability of the individual 
defendants for relying on faulty plans is so serious as to put them “towards the high end of 
the range of penalty available”.  
 
Two final points need to be made. First, none of this is to suggest that the behaviour of those 
concerned was good enough. With  hindsight it is clear that  the standard of care being 
applied was quite inadequate. The industry has learnt this lesson well and NSW mines are 
now subject to stringent requirements aimed at avoiding the possibility of inrush. The bar 
has been raised. Were there to be any repeat of the Gretley story, those concerned would  be 
unequivocally culpable. 
 
The second point may seem almost paradoxical in light of the first. To question the 
culpability of the Gretley defendants is not necessarily to question the appropriateness of the 
prosecution and punishment of these individuals. As discussed in earlier chapters, retribution 
is not the only purpose of punishment;  deterrence or, more generally, prevention is another, 
which may justify punishment even in the absence of culpability. I shall have more to say 
about this in a later chapter. The point here is simply that, on the basis of the evidence 
presented so far, the conclusion that these individuals are blameworthy and therefore 
deserving of punishment seems somewhat unfair.  
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CHAPTER B 
 
GRETLEY – THE WARNINGS 
 
As we saw in the preceding chapter, the courts seeks to make judgments about culpability. 
Where an employer has failed to take effective steps to manage a risk with potentially 
serious consequences, then the more foreseeable the risk the more culpable the defendant. In 
short, given a potentially serious risk, forseeability is the crucial test of culpability. I have 
argued that, despite what he said, the judge in the Gretley case focused of the question of 
whether or not is was foreseeable at the outset that the plans provided by the Department 
might be in error.  
 
The whole situation changed, however, in the weeks immediately prior to the inrush. 
Indications began to emerge that the Gretley miners were closer to the old workings than the 
maps indicated. These indications were considered but effectively dismissed. Had they been 
taken more seriously the accident could have been averted.  
 
The question to be addressed here is whether these indicators made it reasonably foreseeable 
in the last few days that the maps might be in error. The purpose is two-fold. First, by 
contrasting the court’s approach to these two situations I want to demonstrate the somewhat 
arbitrary nature of judgments about culpability. Second, I want to point to  ways in which 
this accident realistically could have been avoided. 
 
The Gretley disaster generated two sets of findings. In 1997/8 an inquiry was held before 
Judge J Staunton. Its purpose was to establish the causes of the accident and it was not a 
forum for determining liability. One of its recommendations was that consideration be given 
to prosecuting the companies. The prosecution took place in 2003/4. So far the focus has 
been on the findings of the prosecution. This chapter draws heavily on the findings of the 
earlier inquiry. When I speak here of the inquiry I refer to the first, judicial inquiry. Any 
references to the court are to the later prosecution. 
 
The indicators mentioned above were reports made by various people, as mining approached 
the old workings, that water was seeping out of the mine face and accumulating at a low 
point on the tunnel floor. The question is: how should these reports have been interpreted? 
One influential view is “any water inflow in the vicinity of abandoned mines… should be 
considered a danger signal”96. 
 
However matters were not quite so simple. Gretley was a wet mine and flows of water out of 
the seam were to be expected. Nevertheless, there was something unusual about the flow of 
water. As one witness observed 
 
“Gretley is a very wet mine, all the districts are wet, the water percolates from one 
district to another because of the way it is developed. The funny thing about (the 
district where the inrush occurred) and I always commented when I went in there, it is 
… (a ) pleasure to come into this district, it is the driest district in the pit. It was 
probably the only district in the pit without a pump”.97
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The appearance of water did not demonstrate conclusively that mining was close to the old 
workings because an increase of water flow from the face could be expected as the old 
workings were approached, even though those workings were still at a considerable 
distance98. But clearly, the reports were an indication of possible danger. Before proceeding 
further it will be useful to list these reports.  
 
The reports of water 
 
November 1  
 
Day shift safety officer, Mr M, made the following comment in his end of shift report: 
 
“Nuisance accumulation of water”99
 
November 4 
 
Mr M made another, similar comment in his end of shift report: 
 
 “Large amount of nuisance water”100
 
Two other shift safety officers told the inquiry that it was unusual for safety officers to 
make such comments in their end of shift reports and the inquiry came to the same 
conclusion itself, having perused a large number of end of shift reports.101 Mr M 
explained later that although he had used the term “nuisance” water, he was intending 
to draw management attention to a potential danger.102  
 
Also on November 4, Mr M reported the accumulation of water to the mine manager 
who happened to be underground doing an inspection. He said to him “There is water 
gathered in 7 cutthrough. We are not close to the old mine are we?”103.  
 
That night, the night shift safety officer, Mr B, commented to the shift manager about 
the accumulation of water. He observed that the accumulation of water had increased 
since November 1. He also told the shift manager’s superior the undermanager in 
charge, about the water and the fact that it appeared to be unusual.  
 
He said later “It seemed to me that for a panel (area of the mine) in such good 
condition there was more water laying around the floor than I would have expected”104
 
November 13 
 
The day shift safety officer, Mr M, spoke about the water on various occasions to the 
driver of the mining machine, as well as speaking to two other miners. He asked them 
repeatedly: “where’s all that water coming from?”105. In his end of shift report he 
stated: 
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“coal seam giving out a considerable amount of water” 
  
It was the next day, November 14, that miners broke through into old workings. 
 
Management response to the reports 
 
Following the November 4 reports the shift manager examined the water and concluded it 
might have been coming out of the floor.106 His superior, the undermanager in charge 
concluded that the increased quantity of water was to be expected as they were heading 
towards the old workings.107 His superior the mine manager, observed the water 
accumulation but told the safety officer that the old mine was about 200 metres away. The 
inquiry made the following comment on this response: 
 
“The misgivings of an experienced deputy about a serious potential hazard, namely 
inrush, ought to have made (the manager) pause, and reflect upon what was being said. 
Instead, he brushed Mr M’s concern to one side, glibly referring to the plan. A warning 
went unheeded which, had it been taken seriously and investigated, may have exposed 
the (error in the plan).”108  
 
Following the report of November 13 the shift manager immediately turned to the mine plan 
and measured what he thought to be the distance between the face and the old workings109. 
He discussed the matter with the safety officer who had made the report and thereupon 
decided that nothing further needed to be done. Precisely what the safety officer said that led 
to this outcome is in doubt. Both parties subsequently told the inquiry that he had effectively 
contradicted his written report and said to the shift manager that the “considerable” amount 
of water was in fact only a “trickle”. It was this that led the shift manager to do nothing. 
 
The inquiry did not accept this version of the conversation and expressed the opinion that it 
was intended to protect the company110. The inquiry’s view was that whatever the safety 
officer may have said to the shift manager, he remained of the view that what he saw was a 
“considerable” amount of water, enough to give rise to concern.  
 
“He saw the link, or possible link, between the water and the old workings, and 
recognized that it may be a symptom of danger. He was right to do so”111.  
 
The inquiry went on to say that the shift manager’s “investigation of the observations by Mr 
M were superficial. Having recognized from Mr M’s report the symptoms of danger, they 
were dismissed too readily”112.  
 
To summarise, the inquiry characterised management’s response to the warnings as 
“superficial”, “glib”, and certainly inadequate113. 
 
Differences between the inquiry and the court on the investigation of warnings  
 
Let us return to the prosecution. How did the court deal with these matters? One of the 
charges laid against the companies was as follows: 
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“(h) a failure to investigate, adequately or at all, the (safety officers’) written reports on 1 
November, 4 November and 13 November 1996 and two oral reports on 4 November 
1996”114
 
The judge inclined to the view that “the defendant did adequately investigate the reports of 
water… Ultimately, it has to be said the steps and investigations undertaken to investigate 
the reports of water… were made against the background of the presumed location of the… 
old workings… being 100 metres or more away”.115 In other words, given the presumption 
that the plans were accurate, management acted reasonably in dismissing the warning signs. 
More cautiously he went on to say, “Overall, I am not satisfied that the failure (h) has been 
established to the requisite standard”.  
 
The contrast between the judgments of the court and the inquiry is perplexing. Could it be an 
outcome of the different nature of the proceedings – one a criminal prosecution and the other 
a judicial inquiry? In a criminal matter the prosecution is required to establish its case 
beyond reasonable doubt. That is the “requisite standard”. The findings at the judicial 
inquiry, on the other hand, were made on the balance of probabilities. It was thus in theory 
easier for the inquiry than the court to draw adverse conclusions from the same evidence. 
However, the comments of the court suggest that this was not the real issue. Even on the 
balance of probabilities the judge would probably have dismissed the charge. Another 
possibility is that the nature of the evidence put before these two tribunals was different. The 
comments made by the court do suggest that the evidence available to it may have been 
more limited. A third possibility is that the difference is simply a demonstration of 
somewhat uncertain nature of judgments about culpability: the court taking the view that the 
various managers at Gretley behaved reasonably in relation to the reports of water and the 
inquiry believing that they did not. I shall return to this shortly. 
 
The decision to drill ahead 
 
There is one way in which mine management could have been sure that the old workings 
were not closer than indicated on the plan, and that was to check what lay ahead by drilling 
forward from where mining was taking place. Drilling could also determine if there were 
any unusual geological formations ahead.  
 
The possibility of drilling ahead was discussed in the first week of November and the 
undermanager in charge made the final decision to drill ahead just before he went on leave 
on November 8116. On 13 November, the day before the inrush, a management meeting 
ratified this decision. The minutes state: “Advance drill 60 m to prove ground to be 
driven”117.  
 
Why was the decision made at this time, just days after the first reports of water had been 
made? The undermanager in charge told the inquiry that “water played no part in the 
decision to drill”118. But in other statements he made it clear that water was the precipitating 
factor. He recounted a conversation he had with a subordinate shift manager, to the best of 
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his recollection at the end of October or early November, in which he had discussed the 
water that was building up.  
 
Shift manager: “Have you thought about putting a borehole in advance of the 
workings?” 
Undermanager in charge: “I hadn’t planned to. We are still a long way from the old 
workings. It would be useful to put the hole in the prove the ground in front of us”119.  
 
Elsewhere he spoke of drilling ahead as “giving us the added safety factor as to the presence 
of the old workings”120 and being undertaken so that the mine did not “run into any 
surprises”.121
 
One interchange at the inquiry was the following  
 
Q: Is not (the possibility that the water was coming from the old workings) the thing 
that provoked the thought that we had better just prove the ground ahead? 
A: It was part of it, I suppose, yes.”122  
 
Perhaps the most telling interchange was this:  
 
Q: (The decision to drill ahead) was a step that you had suggested, amongst other 
reasons, as an insurance against risk? 
A: That’s correct. 
Q: The risk that the old workings might be closer than the plans in fact indicated, is 
that right? 
A: You could assume that, yes. 
Q: And even though that risk to you may not have been a high risk at the time, it was 
perceived by you as risk, is that not right? 
A: As a minimum risk.123  
 
The inquiry concluded in relation to the undermanager in charge that: “the presence of water 
had brought to his mind the possibility, although he thought it minimal, that the old 
workings were closer than the plan indicated”124, and by implication that the plan was 
wrong. The inquiry also made the following statement concerning the undermanager who 
had initiated the conversation above: “the (inquiry) believes that he did recognise the 
possibility that the plan may be inaccurate”125. In short, according to the inquiry, both these 
men foresaw the possibility that the plans might be in error. 
 
Evidence was also provided to the inquiry that the miners themselves understood that the 
purpose of drilling was to check that they were not about to break through inadvertently into 
the old workings.126
  
The criminal court, on the other hand, did not draw this conclusion. The judge stated that 
there was no evidence that allowed him to conclude with certainty that the decision to drill 
ahead was connected to the reports of water127. He had before him the minutes recording the 
decision to “advance drill 60 m to prove ground to be driven”. But, he said, no evidence had 
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been provided about exactly what this meant. It seems, therefore, that in this case the 
difference between the two tribunals reflected differences in the evidence put before them. 
 
The actions of the surveyor 
 
In early November the surveyor asked someone where he might get independent evidence of 
the location of the old mine, and he was referred to an agency called the Mine Subsidence 
Board. The plans made available by the Board turned out to be the very same plans available 
at the Department of Mines, including sheet 1. But they were made available on microfiche 
and sheet 1, when printed out, was of such poor quality that it was discarded.128 It will be 
recalled from the last chapter that this was the sheet that showed both sets of workings on 
the same plan, which should have cast serious doubt on the accuracy of the plans on which 
the mine management was relying. In the end, then, despite the surveyor’s efforts to obtain 
independent verification of the location of the workings, his efforts were in vain.  
 
Why did he go to this effort to check the accuracy of the mine plans? There was some 
dispute about the evidence but the inquiry judge  made the following findings, “as a matter 
of probability”. The surveyor had been present at the discussion between the two managers 
about the water and the need to drill ahead. “He recognized that drilling ahead was being 
suggested because there was the possibility that the plan may be inaccurate. He therefore 
decided to check the plan”129. In short, the surveyor, like the undermanagers, foresaw the 
possibility that the plans were in error. 
 
The court took a somewhat contradictory view of  surveyor’s actions. It stated that   “the 
inference arising from such an inquiry (to the Mine Subsidence Board) is that mine 
management, through (the surveyor), was responding to reports of water…that were 
surfacing at about that time and that (the surveyor) was double checking the location of 
the… old workings”130. The further inference is that the mine management had foreseen the 
possibility that the maps might be in error. The court did not explicitly  draw this inference. 
 
Culpability 
 
The inquiry was not a tribunal set up for the purpose of establishing culpability. Its findings 
are however directly relevant to this issue. Let us recall earlier statement on which the court 
relied. 
 
“The degree of foreseeability is a significant fact to be taken in to account when assessing 
the level of culpability of the defendant. The existence of a reasonably foreseeable risk to 
safety which is likely to result in serious injury or death is a factor which will be relevant to 
the assessment of the gravity of the offence.”131
 
In short, other things being equal, the degree of culpability is directly related to degree of 
foreseeability. 
 
It will be remembered that prior to the commencement of mining, no one foresaw the 
possibility that the plans might be in error and the question for the court was whether a 
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reasonable person would have. That issue does not arise here. The inquiry found that in the 
final days before the inrush, the people concerned actually foresaw the possibility that the 
plans were in error. There could hardly be better evidence that this was a reasonably 
foreseeable possibility. Based on the findings of the inquiry and the test of culpability spelt 
out by the court, it can be concluded that these individuals were indeed culpable for their 
failure to respond adequately to the warnings of danger that occurred in the days 
immediately preceding the inrush. 
 
But that is not the end of the matter. We need to consider just what would have constituted 
an appropriate response to the warnings. Drilling ahead was one appropriate response. But 
the drilling was scheduled to commence a day or two after November 14, the day of the 
inrush132. For drilling to have been effective, mining should have stopped until drilling had 
indeed proved the ground ahead.  
 
Why didn’t the managers concerned suspend mining? The answer appears to be that 
although the undermanager in charge foresaw the possibility that the plans might be in error, 
he regarded this as a remote possibility, and therefore judged that the risk in continuing to 
mine, even though the ground ahead had not been proved, was an acceptably low risk. We 
are back here to the question of reasonableness. Is this a judgment which a reasonable 
manager would have made? If so, this would presumably diminish the culpability which 
arises from the fact that he foresaw the risk but allowed mining to continue133. If, however, 
we judge that a reasonable manager in the circumstances would have ordered work to stop 
immediately, until the ground ahead had been proved, then the manager’s failure remains 
culpable. The court did not deal explicitly with this point, but the inquiry made the following 
comment. 
 
“(The undermanager-in-charge) gave no direction to suspend mining and monitor the 
build up of water, as he ought to have done” (emphasis added)134. 
 
In so saying the inquiry was clearly blaming this individual. 
 
A second appropriate response to the warning signs would have been for the surveyor to 
thoroughly research the location of the old workings. The approach to the Mine Subsidence 
Board turned out to yield no new information. Did this absolve the surveyor of 
responsibility? The court did not pass judgment on this particular question, but the inquiry 
did:  
He should not have stopped his investigation at that point. Once there was a doubt in 
his mind, it was his duty, first to inform the manager, and secondly to resolve that 
doubt completely (or disclose to his superiors that it was incapable of resolution, 
because of the paucity of material)135. 
 
The inquiry was critical of the surveyor for failing to check the plans adequately in the first 
place but it regarded as especially blameworthy this failure to take effective action after the 
possibility was recognized that that the plans might be in error.  
 
 25
“It was completely unacceptable for (the surveyor) not to sound a strong warning in 
early November (at the very latest) and recommend that development be suspended 
immediately pending proper inquiry and confirmation”136
 
It would seem, therefore, that as far as the inquiry was concerned, having foreseen the risk, 
the individuals were under an obligation to act effectively to counteract that risk. Their 
culpability lay in foreseeing the risk but failing to respond effectively.  
 
At this point it needs to be stressed that this discussion does not translate automatically into 
conclusions about liability under the OHS Act. The Act envisages that when a corporation 
commits  an offence, individuals may be found guilty of the same offence, only if they are 
“concerned in the management of the corporation”. The undermanagers had been charged, 
along with the managers and the surveyor. But, after a long  discussion of what it meant to 
be “concerned in the management of the corporation”,  the court found as follows.  
 
“I cannot be satisfied beyond reasonable doubt that those personal defendants 
employed as undermanagers and undermanagers in charge at Gretley were persons 
concerned in the management the corporations.” 137
 
All charges against them were therefore dismissed. No matter how culpable they might be 
they were not liable under the Act. In contrast, the court found that the surveyor and  the 
mine managers were persons “concerned in the management of the corporation” and 
therefore went on to convict them and make judgments about their culpability. 
 
Conclusion  
 
The court was not critical of the failure to respond effectively to the last minute warnings. It 
concluded that the investigations of the reports of water were adequate, in the circumstances, 
and that the failure to drill ahead in time was irrelevant, since it had not been proved beyond 
reasonable doubt that the decision to drill ahead had anything to do with the reports of water. 
Nor was the failure to effectively investigate the accuracy of the plans at this stage 
especially culpable. These failures were all, in the court’s view, a consequence of the initial 
failure to investigate the accuracy of the plans prior to the commencement of mining. It was 
this initial failure that the court found so culpable, despite the fact the managers and 
surveyors had behaved as many other ordinary managers and surveyors would probably 
have behaved in the same circumstances.  
 
The evidence presented to the inquiry, however, led it to a different conclusion, namely, that 
the failure to respond to the warning signs was indeed culpable. The inquiry judge did not 
use the word “culpable” but that is the inevitable implication of his language. His view with 
respect to culpability was almost the reverse of the court’s, in that he appeared to conclude 
that the initial failure to investigate the accuracy of the plans was not as culpable as the 
failure to take effective action once the warnings emerged. Whether or not this alternative 
view is accepted, one thing stands out. In the Gretley matter two different tribunals went 
over the same material and came to significantly different conclusions, demonstrating just 
how uncertain and idiosyncratic judgments about culpability can sometimes be.  
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